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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DoUBLE JEOPARDY- PROSECU-
TION OF RELATED OFFENSES IN SEPARATE TRIALS. Jordan v. Vir-
ginia, No. 78-6540 (4th Cir. June 2, 1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jordan v. Virginia,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that separate trial prosecutions for related offenses
arising from a single criminal episode might violate the double
jeopardy clause2 even though those same offenses could be pros-
ecuted in a single action. In reaching its decision, the court
found that if evidence used in prosecuting an earlier charge
would sustain a subsequent charge, the offenses are the same,
and double jeopardy bars the second prosecution.3
On May 6, 1976, defendant entered a drugstore in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia and procured a quantity of the drug Es-
katrol by presenting a forged prescription to the pharmacist.
Subsequently, defendant was arrested and charged with the mis-
demeanor offense of obtaining a drug with a forged prescription 4
and the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance.
1. No. 78-6540 (4th Cir. June 2, 1980).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. No. 78-6540, slip op. at 10.
4. VA. CODE § 54-524.76 (1950)(repealed 1977)(subject currently addressed at VA.
CODE § 18.2-258.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980)) provided as follows:
No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain any drug or procure or attempt to
procure the administration of any drug: (1) by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation,
or subterfuge; or (2) by the forgery or alteration of a prescription or of any
written order; or (3) by the concealment of a material fact; or (4) by the use of
a false name or the giving of a false address.
5. Under VA. CODE § 18.2-250 (Cum. Supp. 1980), it is unlawful "for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was
obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner
while acting in the course of his professional practice. . . ." Defendant was charged with
obtaining a schedule II controlled substance, defined as a substance in current medical
use, but with a high potential for abuse that will lead to severe psychic or physiological
dependence. VA. CODE § 54-524.89:5 (replacement vol. 1978).
A store employee had followed defendant into a parking lot and observed him in
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Defendant was tried and convicted on the misdemeanor
charge, and nearly two months later, was tried and convicted on
the felony charge. At the second trial, defendant raised a double
jeopardy defense, claiming that the earlier misdemeanor convic-
tion for the illegal procurement of a controlled substance barred
subsequent prosecution for possession of the same substance.
The trial court rejected this argument,' holding that the related
offenses were not the "same offense" for double jeopardy
purposes.
Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia on the double jeopardy claim, defendant sought relief
by writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district
court ruled that defendant had been placed in double jeopardy
and issued the writ; an appeal by the Commonwealth ensued.
II. ESTABLISHING A DOUBLE JEOPARDY STANDARD FOR
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS
The Commonwealth based its appeal on the two-offense, or
same-evidence, test set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Blockburger v. United States.7 Under this approach,
"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses, or only one, is whether each pro-
vision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not." The Commonwealth reasoned that the misdemeanor of-
fense required proof of illegal procurement or an attempt to pro-
cure, which was not required to prove the felony offense, and the
felony required proof of possession, a fact not required to estab-
lish the misdemeanor offense.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consistently
has applied the two-offense test of Blockburger to double jeop-
ardy questions concerning the constitutionality of multiple pun-
ishments in a single proceeding.10 Jordan, however, was the first
possession of the drug.
6. No. 78-6540, slip op. at 4.
7. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
8. Id. at 304.
9. No, 78-6540, slip op. at 6 n.5.
10. See United States v. Crew, 538 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Cox, 435 F.2d
453 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Oates, 314 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1963); McGann v.
United States, 261 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1958). In view of the court's favorable remarks on
[Vol. 32
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case to present the issue of the constitutionality of separate tri-
als for offenses arising from a single criminal episode.11 In an
opinion by Judge Phillips, the court of appeals upheld the deci-
sion of the district court, rejecting the Blockburger test as inap-
propriate for determining the constitutionality of multiple pros-
ecutions for related offenses. The court noted that although the
two-offense test may be proper for determining whether a defen-
dant may be subjected to multiple punishments for related of-
fenses in a single proceeding, additional interests at stake in
multiple-trial prosecutions warrant an analysis more protective
of the rights of criminal defendants. 2
Double jeopardy protection against retrial for related of-
fenses, according to the court, should vindicate "principles of
finality and repose of former judgments and of fundamental
fairness that simply are not involved in a joined charge prosecu-
tion" 3 and should insure that a defendant should not have to
"run the gauntlet" of criminal trial a second time.14 To protect
these interests, the court fashioned an analysis that focuses on
the actual evidence adduced at the first trial rather than the
evidence required to prove the offense.15 Using this analysis, the
court determined that the defendant had been placed twice in
jeopardy for the same offense.
This actual-evidence test has little support in caselaw 6 and
Jordan regarding the use of the two-offense, or same-evidence, test for determining the
constitutionality of multiple punishments in a single trial, the court will likely continue
to apply the test in those cases in the future. See No. 78-6540, slip op. at 5-7.
11. But see United States v. Fowler, 463 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Va. 1978). Applying the
Blockburger test, the district court in Fowler determined that separate prosecutions for
the receipt of stolen goods and for the sale of the same stolen goods was permissible. Id.
at 652.
12. No. 78-6540, slip op. at 5-7.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 10. By proving in the first trial that the defendant had obtained the
drug, rather than only that he attempted to obtain it, the government established the
essential elements of possession requisite to the felony offense, thereby precluding the
second trial, according to the court. See id.
16. The language on which the court in Jordan relied as authority for the actual-
evidence approach--' "the evidence required to warrant a conviction upon one of the
[prosecutions] would have been sufficient to support a conviction upon the other," '" id.
at 7 (quoting substantially Ex parte Nielsen, 131 US. 176, 188 (1889) (quoting Morey v.
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871)))-does not stand in Morey for the proposi-
tion for which it was cited in Jordan. Rather, the test set forth in Morey was the fore-
runner of the same-evidence test attributed to Blockburger-the very same test the
3
et al.: Comments
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
constitutes a departure from approaches used by other courts. 17
Several federal circuit courts recently have applied the Block-
burger two-offense test to multiple-prosecution situations,18 and
a number of state supreme courts have adopted yet another ap-
proach to the multiple prosecution problem: the same-transac-
tion test.19 This broad test prohibits successive trials for offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode or transaction, and is, in
effect, a rule of joinder.2 °
The United States Supreme Court has addressed double
jeopardy in the context of multiple prosecutions on several occa-
sions, often analyzing in terms of the Blockburger test.21 The
Court, however, has not addressed directly whether double jeop-
ardy may prohibit multiple trials on related charges even if
Blockburger would allow the charges to be brought in a single
proceeding. 22 In Gavieres v. United States,2 the Court em-
court rejected in Jordan. Morey underscored that the crucial evidence is not the evi-
dence actually presented, but rather that minimally necessary to prove the crime
charged.
Apparently, an actual-evidence approach has been suggested only once prior to Jor-
dan in the federal courts. In District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir.
1942), Judge Rutledge, in a concurring opinion, noted that "the [same-evidence] test
therefore is useful only in relation to the evidence actually offered, not in relation to
that required to prove the greater offense." Id. at 21. For state court decisions using the
actual-evidence test, see Martinis v. Supreme Court, 15 N.Y.2d 240, 206 N.E.2d 165, 258
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965); Estep v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 103, 143 P. 64 (1914).
17, Two courts of appeals have expressly rejected the use of the actual-evidence
test. See United States v. Brunk, 615 F.2d 210, 211-12 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1979). The Cowart court stated that the "test looks not
to the evidence adduced at trial but focuses on the elements of the offense charged." Id.
at 1029.
18, In United States v. DeCoteau, 516 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1975), for example, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld separate prosecutions for charges of op-
erating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and involuntary manslaughter, yet
both offenses arose from a single criminal incident. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Ortega-Alvarez, 506 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975), upheld separate prosecutions for the sale of narcotics not in their origi-
nal stamped package and for conspiracy to violate narcotic statutes, yet both charges
arose from a single criminal event. Both courts applied the Blockburger test rejected by
the Fourth Circuit.
19. See People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191
(1972). The holding in Brown, but not its rationale, has since been repudiated. State v.
Hammang, 271 Or. 749, 534 P.2d 501 (1975).
20. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970)(Brennan, J., concurring).
21. See text accompanying notes 23 & 27-32 infra.
22. See State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 450, 497 P.2d 1191, 1195 (1972); J. CooK, CON-
4
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ployed the Blockburger two-offense test in upholding separate
trials for offenses arising from the same criminal conduct. The
precedential value of this case is questionable, however, simply
because of the growth of the double jeopardy doctrine since the
case was decided in 1911. In Ciucci v. Illinois,24 the Court up-
held the prosecution of a defendant at three separate trials for
the murder of his family. This decision, however, was based on
due process considerations rather than double jeopardy grounds
since, at the time, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment had not yet been incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment and, therefore, was inapplicable to state prosecutions. In
Ashe v. Swenson,25 the Court recognized that the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel will spare defendants the hardship of second tri-
als under some circumstances. While this doctrine is available to
a defendant acquitted in an earlier proceeding, however, it is
useless to a defendant convicted in an earlier proceeding.26
Thus, Ashe does not solve the problem presented in Jordan.
Two other major cases decided recently by the Court have
raised the issue of double jeopardy in multiple prosecutions. In
Brown v. Ohio,27 the Court employed the Blockburger test to
preclude prosecutions for related offenses. The Court reasoned
that if under that test the "offenses are the same ... for pur-
poses of barring consecutive sentences at a single trial, they nec-
essarily will be the same for purposes of barring successive pros-
ecutions."2 8 However, because the Blockburger test adequately
protected the defendant from multiple trials in that case, the
Court was not compelled to go further. In Jordan, the Fourth
Circuit read Brown to allow a broader test than Blockburger, if
necessary to protect a defendant from double jeopardy in multi-
ple-trial situations.29
Another, arguably less expansive, interpretation of Brown
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AccusED-PosT-TmAL RIGHTS 163 n.62 (1976).
23. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
24. 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
25. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
26. Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 246, 304 A.2d 432, 438 (1973). The
doctrine of collateral estoppel actually works against a defendant convicted at the first
trial because he will be unable to relitigate issues resolved against him.
27. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
28. Id. at 166.
29. No. 78-6540, slip op. at 5-6.
19811 589
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was given by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Vitale,30 a case
decided after Jordan. In that case, the Supreme Court of Illinois
had held that separate prosecutions of an automobile driver for
involuntary manslaughter and failure to reduce speed to avoid a
collision violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. In a
five to four decision, the United States Supreme Court, relying
on Brown, vacated judgment and remanded the case, directing
the Illinois court to determine whether the offenses were the
same under the Blockburger analysis.31 Although it may be in-
ferred from Vitale that Blockburger is to be the sole double
jeopardy test for multiple prosecution situations, the Court did
leave open a possibility that other tests may be used in multiple-
prosecution cases.2
III. DETERMINING THE BEST STANDARD
A. The Blockburger Test
The two-offense, or same-evidence, test, commonly attrib-
uted to Blockburger v. United States,"5 was first expounded in
The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott." There, the court stated
that "unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might
have been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the
second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be
no bar to the second.13 5 This approach was well suited to cope
with the double jeopardy problems of its time. Criminal statutes
were relatively few in number and broad in scope. Accordingly,
offenses were distinguished easily on the basis of their substan-
tive elements.36
30. 100 S. Ct. 2260 (1980).
31. Id. at 2267-68.
32. The Court recognized the Blockburger test as "the principal test for determin-
ing whether two offenses are the same for purposes of barring successive prosecutions."
Id. at 2265 (emphasis added). This qualified statement, along with the Court's recogni-
tion in Brown that "[t]he Blockburger test is not the only standard for determining
whether successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the same offense," 432 U.S. at 166
n.6, suggests that the Court has left open the possibility for other approaches.
33. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
34. 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796).
35. 2 Leach at 720, 168 Eng. Rep. at 461.
36. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 242, 304 A.2d 432, 435-36 (1973).
For a history of the early concept of double jeopardy, see Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the
Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 602 (1934).
[Vol. 32
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Application of the principle im the modern era, however, has
been complicated by the proliferation of criminal statutes.3 An
act that once constituted only a single offense today may violate
several closely related statutory provisions. As a result, prosecu-
tors have vast discretionary power to characterize a criminal act
as one offense or several.
38
A prosecutor may use this discretion to stack related
charges against a defendant in a single proceeding. In so doing,
he simply defers to the presumed intent of the legislature that
each statutory offense be considered separately.39 Questions
arise, however, whether prosecutors should be permitted to sub-
ject defendants arbitrarily or vindictively to "a series of trials
for violations which are part of the same course of conduct and
which could be tried together."'40 Clearly, this unfettered discre-
tion to prosecute charges jointly or separately is allowed under
the two-offense test, so long as the facts needed to prove each
offense are not the same.
The trend among courts, however, appears to be toward rec-
ognition of certain protected interests that militate against arbi-
trary separation of charges.4 1 The interests in protecting defen-
dants from the social stigma and psychological trauma of a
second trial and in protecting a defendant and the public from
the expense of prolonged and unnecessary litigation are fur-
thered by a single proceeding.42 If an important purpose of the
double jeopardy clause is to prohibit vexatious prosecution, 3 the
37. J. SIGLER, DouBLE JEOPARDY 64 (1969); see Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE
L.J. 262, 304 (1965).
38. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 452 (Brennan, J., concurring); Note,
supra note 37, at 304.
39. See Note, supra note 37, at 311.
40. State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 457, 497 P.2d 1191, 1198 (1972) (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause
is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple
expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of spatial units."); Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. at 452 (Brennan, J., concurring)("Given the tendency of modern criminal legislation
to divide the phases of a criminal transaction into numerous separate crimes, the oppor-
tunities for multiple prosecutions for an essentially unitary criminal episode are frighten-
ing."); State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 450, 497 P.2d 1191, 1198 (1972)("The underlying
considerations in multiple punishment cases are entirely different from those involved in
multiple prosecutions .... -).
42. See, e.g., J. SIGLER, supra note 37, at 39-40; Note, Criminal Law: The Same
Offense in Oklahoma, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 131, 133 (1975).
43. D. FELLMAN, THE DEPENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 378 (1976). "The underlying ratio-
1981]
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argument that these interests are entitled to constitutional pro-
tection is persuasive. The court's recognition in Jordan that the
two-offense test of Blockburger does not adequately vindicate
these interests supports a conclusion that the double jeopardy
protection covers an area too broad for a single test.
44
B. Limitations of the Actual-Evidence Test
What then is the appropriate test for determining whether
offenses are the same in multiple prosecution cases? Several var-
iations of the Blockburger test have been formulated in at-
tempts to avoid the hardship imposed by application of the
strict test.45 Although the variants may offer a greater degree of
protection under some circumstances, they generally fail to pro-
nale is that the state should not take advantage of its power to subject a defendant to
avoidable embarrassment, expense, and ordeal, and should not require him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity which enhances the chances of convicting the
innocent." Id. at 356. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 457 (1970)(Brennan, J., concurring); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-
88 (1957)("[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for [the same] ... offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity. .. ").
44. See Note, The Protection from Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L. REV. 735, 745
(1959). In Ashe v. Swenson, Justice Brennan, concurring, said of the Blockburger test:
"[Its deficiencies are obvious. It does not enforce but virtually annuls the constitutional
guarantee." 397 U.S. at 451. In State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972), the
Oregon Supreme Court stated:
Under the same evidence [Blockburger] test ... a defendant is deprived of the
assurance that an acquittal is the end of the matter or that a conviction and
sentence is the final measure of his guilt and punishment. Moreover, repeated
prosecutions strain the resources of the defendant and dissipate those of the
courts and prosecutors, and deprive judgments of their finality.
Id. at 449, 497 P.2d at 1194-95.
45. The Blockburger test has been stated in various ways. Gavieres v. United States,
220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911) (whether "each statute requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not . . . ."); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 380 (1906)(quoting
Commonwealth v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496, 504 (1832)("It must appear that the
offense[s] charged,. . . [were] 'the same in law and in fact.J")); State v. Roberts, 152 La.
283, 287, 93 So. 95, 96 (1922) ("[Tihe rule is that there must be only substantial identity,
that the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient
for the first."); State v. Brownrigg, 87 Me. 500, 501, 33 A. 11, 12 (1895)("The test is, not
what facts were offered in evidence in the trial upon the first indictment, but... what
facts might have been proved under that indictment."); Morey v. Commonwealth, 108
Mass. 433, 434 (1871)(whether "the evidence required to support a conviction upon one
[indictment] . . .[is] sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other.").
8
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tect adequately against multiple prosecutions." One writer has
suggested that "[a]ttempting to choose which version of the
same evidence [Blockburger] test would best implement the
double jeopardy prohibition is like deciding which of five lum-
berjacks would be most handy with a violin.
'4 7
The actual-evidence test used in Jordan is a variation of the
Blockburger test and is based on the actual evidence adduced at
trial rather than that required to prove the charges. Undeniably,
the test effectively protected the interests at stake in that case.
Closer examination, however, reveals that the usefulness of the
test may be limited. In Jordan, the court recognized that
Although the Commonwealth might have charged and
proved only an attempt in the first prosecution, it charged in-
stead the actual "fact situation": a consumated purchase re-
sulting in the defendants obtaining physical possession of the
subject drug. Whether proof that had actually stopped short of
the obtainment but established "attempt" would have created
a different case need not concern us."8
This statement intimates that the court realized the flaw inher-
ent in a test based on actual evidence-it is easily circumvented
by a prosecutor who deliberately charges and proves only what is
necessary to support a conviction on each statutory offense. The
statement also suggests that if in the first trial the prosecution
had proved only what was required by statute to support a con-
viction on the charge, that is, an attempt to procure a controlled
substance,49 the court might have selected an approach other
than the actual-evidence test to achieve the result desired.
Therefore, it appears that the utility of the actual-evidence test
employed in Jordan is limited to the situation presented by the
facts of that case.
C. The Same-Transaction Test
Another approach available to the court which would have
produced a less limited result was the same-transaction test.
46. See, e.g., S. NAGEL, THE RIGHTS Op THE AccusED 291-92 (1972); Note, supra note
37, at 273-75.
47. Note, supra note 37, at 274.
48. No. 78-6540, slip op. at 10 n.9.
49. For the text of the procurement statute, see note 4 supra.
1981] 593
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This test focuses on the criminal episode itself rather than on
the substantive elements of each offense. It is, in effect, a rule of
compulsory joinder,50 requiring, in all but exceptional circum-
stances,5" that the prosecution consolidate at one trial "all the
charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal
act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." 2 The test, which has
been characterized as "the layman's idea of fair play under the
double jeopardy clause,"53 has received increased support in re-
cent years.54 Although the test aparently has not been used in
the federal court system,5 5 it finds a champion in Justice Bren-
nan, who has urged that the test "not only enforces the ancient
prohibition against vexatious multiple prosecutions embodied in
the Double Jeopardy Clause, but responds as well to the increas-
ingly widespread recognition that the consolidation in one law-
suit of all issues arising out of a single transaction or occurrence
best promotes justice, economy, and convenience."5 6
Applied to the facts of Jordan, the same-transaction test
would have flatly prohibited the second prosecution, since both
offenses arose out of a single criminal episode-the "continuous
and uninterrupted conduct that establishes at least one offense
and is so joined in time, place and circumstances that such con-
duct is directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
' '57
At least three state supreme courts have adopted the same-
50. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51. The joinder requirement imposed by the test is subject to some commonsense
exceptions. Id. at 453 n.7 (no single court has jurisdiction of all the alleged crimes); id. at
455 n.11 (either party can show prejudice). See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137
(1977)(the government attempts to join charges but the defendant objects); Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)(additional charge is not discovered until after the
commencement of an action for other charges arising from the same criminal
transaction).
52. 397 U.S. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring). The court in Jordan discussed in
dictum the theory of continuing offenses, which is similar to the same-transaction test.
The theory suggests that when an offense is of a continuing nature, prosecution on any
temporal segment of the offense bars future prosecution on other segments. No. 78-6540,
slip op. at 11.
53. Comment, Double Jeopardy-Defining the Same Offense, 32 LA. L. REV. 87, 92
(1971).
54. See J. CooR, supra note 22, at 152-54; D. FELLmAN, supra note 43, at 278-79; J.
SIGLER, supra note 37, at 64-69. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
55. The test has been neither formally adopted nor rejected by the Supreme Court.
56. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 454 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. OR. REV. STAT. § 131.505(4) (1979).
10
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transaction test in cases analogous to Jordan.", The American
Law Institute Model Penal Code 59 also supports the same-trans-
action test: "a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials
for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from
the same criminal episode, if such offenses are known to the ap-
propriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement
of the first trial . . . ."0 The American Bar Association Stan-
dards Relating to Joinder and Severance l and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 2 also encourage the joinder of related
charges in a single proceeding.
Despite the appeal of the test, several commentators suggest
that the elastic nature of the term "transaction" renders this
test easy prey for abuses of discretion, and that it is, therefore,
no better than the Blockburger test.6 This proposition is unten-
able because it fails to recognize a fundamental distinction be-
tween the two tests-the Blockburger test vests discretion in the
prosecution, whereas the same-transaction test vests discretion
in the trial judge. The judiciary is the institution charged with
preserving constitutional rights." The prosecutor, on the other
hand, is an advocate whose office requires persuasive presenta-
tion of all evidence favorable to the government's case. 5 That
discretionary judgments of constitutional magnitude should be
made by an impartial mediator rather than by an adversarial
party would seem just.66
58. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. In Connelly v. Director of Pub. Pros-
ecutions, [1964] A.C. 1254, the House of Lords, which some consider to be the birthplace
of the modern double jeopardy principle, promulgated a rule of court that prosecutors
generally must join in one action charges that are based on the same facts or that are
part of a series of offenses of similar character.
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
60. Id.
61. ABA STANDARDs RELATING TO JOINDER AnI SEVERANCE § 1.3 (Approved Draft
1968).
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).
63. See Comment, supra note 53, at 92; 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1974).
64. Before assuming office, state and federal judges must take an oath to support
the Constitution of the United States. 4 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1976).
65. G. Felkenes, The Criminal Justice System: Its Functions and Personnel, in THE
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICA 18-21 (J. Douglass ed. 1977). But see EC 7-14, ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmmrrY ("A government lawyer who has discretionary power rela-
tive to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously
unfair.").
66. See People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 259 n.9, 212 N.W.2d 222, 228 n.9
(1973) (prosecutor admitted that additional charges arising from same criminal transac-
19811 595
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Other resistance to the same-transaction test arises from a
misunderstanding of the appropriate scope of the test. It must
be remembered that the test is applicable only in multiple-pros-
ecution cases; whether charges may be joined in a single pro-
ceeding remains a question peculiarly within the province of the
Blockburger test.
6 7
The same-transaction test is likely to continue to grow in
popularity and frequency of use. In most instances, the impact
of the test on existing law will not be severe because joinder of
related charges is permitted in nearly all jurisdictions and has
become virtually automatic in most.68 Several states have en-
acted statutes that compel joinder under some circumstances.6 9
Further, the test establishes a clear standard for prosecutors by
requiring them to join their best counts for a single trial, thereby
promoting the conservation of public and private resources and
assuring that defendants need "run the gauntlet" of criminal
prosecution only once. 0
IV. CONCLUSION
In Jordan v. Virginia, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that when related offenses growing out of a sin-
gle criminal episode are prosecuted at more than one trial, vital
interests of justice, economy, and convenience warrant a double
jeopardy standard more protective than the traditional Block-
burger two-offense test. Although the Supreme Court failed to
discuss these additional interests in Vitale, the approach taken
by the Fourth Circuit seems consonant with the policies under-
lying the double jeopardy prohibition. To further the interests
recognized in Jordan, the Court of Appeals might have applied
tion were brought in a second trial because prosecutor was unhappy with sentence given
defendant at first trial; court noted duty of trial judge, not prosecutor, to pass judgment
on defendant).
67. But see People v. Carter, 94 Mich. App. 501, 290 N.W.2d 46 (1979)(court ap-
peared to employ same-transaction test to determine whether multiple punishments may
be secured in single proceeding).
68. Note, supra note 30, at 294. For procedural rules authorizing joinder, see, e.g.,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 and CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1970).
69. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (West 1964); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
40.20(2) (McKinney 1971).
70. See Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 251-52, 304 A.2d 432, 440-41
(1973).
[Vol. 32
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the same-transaction test to the facts of the case. This test, com-
pelling joinder of related charges, would render the result de-
sired in Jordan, would eliminate the potential for abuses of dis-
cretion by prosecutors, and would promote more fully justice,
economy, and convenience.
Unfortunately, the court applied, instead, an actual-evi-
dence test, which appears to be of limited value. Because that
test is easily circumvented by prosecutors, it normally will give
the defendant no greater protection than the Blockburger test.
Colin Scott Cole Fulton
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PROCEDURE-THE RECALL OF MANDATE DOCTRINE. Uzzell v.
Friday, 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1980).
In its most recent consideration of Uzzell v. Friday,1 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the original
judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina2 and remanded the case to that court
for development of the record and further findings of fact and
conclusions of law. This decision followed recall by the court of
its earlier mandate nine months after it was issued. The action
gave new life to a suit that appeared to have been concluded a
year earlier' and placed the litigants in essentially the same po-
sitions they had been in when the suit began six years earlier.
The court's action in recalling its mandate a full nine
months after the decision that prompted issuance of that man-
date4 illustrates the tension which exists between two basic poli-
cies of the law. The first of these policies is finality of judg-
ment-the principle "that litigation must at some definite point
come to an end."5 In frequent conflict with this is the equally
important policy that favors fairness and correct results in liti-
gation-the interest in justice that is the foundation of the legal
system.6 The courts must balance these opposing interests when
considering a motion to vacate or amend a judgment.
1. 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2917 (1980).
2. Uzzell v. Friday, 401 F. Supp. 775 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
3. Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997 (4th Cir. 1979).
4. Id. This case was decided on February 2, 1979; mandate was issued on February
23, 1979; and the time for appeals and petitions for writ of certiorari had passed when
the court of appeals recalled its mandate on November 9, 1979.
5. FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 213 (1952). See Ha-
zel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944); Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931); United States v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878); Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 332, 336 (1813). In
Baldwin, the court stated that "[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation;
that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; and
that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties." 283
U.S. at 525.
6. See Gondeck v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25, 26 (1965); Bankers
Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970). See generally United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 109 (1957)(Harlan,
J., dissenting); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-45
(1944).
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The district courts can look to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for guidance in determining whether relief from a
final judgment can be granted. Rule 60(b) lists the grounds that
will justify relief from judgment7 and limits the time in which
motions for such relief must be made." There is no comparable
rule of appellate procedure to govern the granting of relief by a
court of appeals from its own decisions.9 As a result, the recall of
a mandate is a matter of the court's discretion, guided by the
principles of finality and justice as applied in previous decisions
of the federal courts. In an effort to determine whether the court
has followed traditional concepts or stepped beyond established
boundaries in reviving Uzzell v. Friday,10 this Comment will
compare the decision with the principles established in other
cases concerning recall.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN Uzzell v. Friday
Plaintiffs Uzzell and Arrington, white male students at the
University of North Carolina, brought a class action in district
court against the president of the university and the leaders of a
campus organization known as the Black Student Movement
(BSM). The complaint alleged that certain practices of the uni-
versity and the student Campus Governing Council (Council) vi-
olated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides as follows:
On motion and upon such as terms are just, the court may relieve a party...
from a final judgment,. . . for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud
. . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judg-
ment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or ... vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
For a further discussion of Rule 60(b), see Note, Relief From Unfairly Obtained Ver-
dicts in Federal Court: Determination and Analysis of the Level of Fraud Required for
Vacation of Judgments Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 30 S.C.L. REv. 781 (1979).
8. Motions based upon mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be made
within one year of the entry of judgment. All motions must be made within a reasonable
time. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
9. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for issuance and stay of man-
date, but do not mention recall. FED. R. App. P. 41. The Fifth Circuit has attempted to
fill this void with its own rule of court, providing that "[a] mandate once issued shall not
be recalled except to prevent injustice." 5TH Cm. R. 15.
10. 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2917 (1980).
[Vol. 32
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss3/6
1981] RECALL OF MANDATE DOCTRINE
ment,1 the Civil Rights Act of 1871,12 and section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1s Plaintiffs challenged university fund-
ing of BSM, which restricted its membership to blacks, as well
as provisions of the student constitution mandating the racial
and sexual composition of the Council and the Student Honor
Court.
The district court granted summary judgment for defen-
dants14 "without full development of the record" 15 on the
grounds that the complaint concerning BSM was moot16 and
that the remaining causes of action presented no justiciable in-
jury. Because of the summary judgment, the court did not reach
the question of certification of the suit as a class action.
17
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's summary judgment with respect to
BSM, but reversed the judgment concerning the Council and the
Honor Court.' The court granted summary judgment to plain-
tiffs on these claims, declaring the relevant student constitution
provisions to be invalid because they were "related to race with
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The amendment provides in pertinent part as follows:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended 1979). At the time the suit was brought the
statute provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). This statute provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
14. Uzzell v. Friday, 401 F. Supp. 775 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
15. 625 F.2d at 1119.
16. On September 18, 1974, the organization's membership policies were amended to
grant membership to any student, regardless of race, whose views were consistent with
the organization's goals of furthering Black unity and offering outlets for the expression
of Black ideas and culture. 401 F. Supp. at 777.
17. Id. at 777 n.1.
18. Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1977).
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no reasonable or compelling nexus to that classification."19
The court reheard the case in banc on June 8, 1977. Because
he had sat on the panel originally hearing the case, Senior Cir-
cuit Judge Bryan also sat as a member of this in banc court, as
permitted by the Judicial Code.20 The court split four to three,
with the majority confirming the decision of the panel.2" The
three dissenters advocated returning the case to the district
court for further development of the record regarding the stu-
dent constitution provisions.2 2
On July 3, 1978, the United States Supreme Court granted
defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari, 23 vacated the judg-
ment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Regents of University of California v.
Bakke.24 Pursuant to the Supreme Court mandate, the court of
appeals reheard the case in banc on November 16, 1978. Senior
Circuit Judge Bryan sat as a member of the court, as he had in
the first in banc rehearing.
On February 2, 1979, the second in banc court reaffirmed its
earlier decision, 5 the majority holding that, notwithstanding
Bakke, the two student constitution provisions at issue violated
the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Acts of 1871
and 1964.28 The court again split four to three, with the same
judges dissenting27 and arguing once more that the case should
19. Id. at 804.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976)(amended 1978). At that time the statute provided in
part as follows:
A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active services. A
circuit judge of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also
be competent to sit as a judge of the court in banc in the hearing of a case or
controversy if he sat in the court or division at the original hearing thereof.
Id.
21. Uzzell v. Friday, 558 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1977).
22. Chief Judge Haynsworth and Circuit Judges Winter and Butzner expressed the
opinion that the record was not complete enough for decision on the merits in that it did
not tell "the whole story of the history of discrimination or non-discrimination at the
university, the need for remedial measures, the reasonableness of the measures and how,
in practice, they have operated . . . . [T]hese are all factors bearing on the ultimate
merits." Id. at 728 (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
23. Friday v. Uzzell, 438 U.S. 912 (1978).
24. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25. Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997 (1979).
26. See notes 11-13 supra.
27. See note 22 supra.
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be remanded to the district court.28 The court's mandate to the
district court was issued on February 23, 1979. Because there
were no appeals or petitions for writ of certiorari within the time
permitted by law,2 the decision of the second in banc court be-
came final.
During the second in banc rehearing the court and counsel
were unaware that on October 20, 1978, less than one month
before the rehearing, Congress had amended the Judicial Code
to provide that an in banc court must consist only of active cir-
cuit judges.30 As a result, Judge Bryan's participation in the sec-
ond rehearing was unauthorized. The court did not become
aware of the change in the law until after all deadlines for re-
view had passed.
On May 31, 1979, the court sent a letter to counsel for all
litigants, informing them of the change in the law and inviting
suggestions about what should be done, if anything, under the
circumstances.-" Counsel for the defendants responded with a
request that the court simply not count Judge Bryan's vote,
thereby affirming the district court's original decision by the
vote of an equally divided court. Defendants' counsel did not
move to recall the mandate. Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the
judgment was final and should be left in repose and requested
full briefing and a hearing should a motion be made for recall of
28. The dissenting judges stated that in their view the Bakke decision recognized
and approved the use of racial criteria in measures designed to redress wrongs worked by
racial discrimination, so long as such remedial steps worked "the least harm possible on
other innocent persons competing for the benefit." 591 F.2d 997, 1001 (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 308). For this reason, the dissenters felt that it was essential that the case be
returned to the district court for a full trial to develop the factors identified in their first
dissenting opinion. See generally note 22 supra. The dissent also suggested that the case
should be remanded to the district court for consideration of the possibility that the
litigation had become moot "either because all named plaintiffs [had] severed their con-
nections with the University, or ... no named plaintiff had maintained a continuing
connection with the University." 591 F.2d at 1001.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1976) provides that "[a]ny ... appeal or any writ of certio-
rari intended to bring any judgment or decree in a civil action ... before the Supreme
Court for review shall be taken or applied for within 90 days after the entry of such
judgment or decree." See generally Sup. CT. R. 22(3).
30. The Omnibus Judgeship Bill, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 5(a), 92 Stat. 1633, repealed
the last sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), so that the present statute provides that "[a] court
in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service." 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(Cur. Supp. 1980).
31. The complete text of the letter is printed in Uzzell v. Friday, 625 F.2d 1117,
1123 (4th Cir. 1980) (Widener, J., dissenting).
1981]
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mandate. "At that point, the court was... equally divided on
whether to recall the mandate .... Thus, had the matter been
finally terminated at that juncture, the judgment of the court
would have remained undisturbed, for a majority did not exist to
recall the mandate.
32
On November 9, 1979, an expanded court, without the brief-
ing or hearing requested by plaintiffs, recalled the mandate on
its own motion, withdrew the in banc opinion of February 2,
1979, and ordered that the case be reheard in banc a third
time. 33 The case was reargued on January 7, 1980. Shortly there-
after, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari,3 4 question-
ing whether "recall of mandate after nine months and after ap-
pointment of two new judges depart[s] from accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings."3 5 The Supreme Court requested
that defendants file a response to the petition for certiorari and
scheduled consideration of the petition for May 15, 1980.36 On
May 12, 1980, the court of appeals filed its opinion from the
third in banc hearing of the case.
7
The third in banc court affirmed the district court judgment
with respect to funding of BSM, but vacated the judgment con-
cerning the two student constittition provisions. It remanded the
case "for the development of a full record and for findings of
fact and conclusions of law in the light of Bakke and what was
said in the dissenting opinions in the first and second in banc
cases," 38 and for consideration of the possible mootness issue
discussed in the dissenting opinion of the second in banc case. 9
IL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RECALL OF MANDATE
The principle of finality of judgment is based upon the
32. Id.
33. Between May 31, 1979, when the court of appeals invited suggestions from coun-
sel, and November 9, 1979, when the mandate was recalled, two new circuit judges were
commissioned. These new judges joined with the judges who had dissented in the previ-
ous in banc decision to form the majority in a five to three vote to recall the mandate. Id.
at 1123.
34. 48 U.S.L.W. 3538 (1980).
35. Id. at 3617.
36. The petition for writ of certiorari was denied on May 19, 1980. Uzzell v. Friday,
100 S. Ct. 2917 (1980).
37. 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 1121.
39. See 591 F.2d at 1001. The majority in this five to three decision was composed of
[Vol. 32604
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strong interests in insuring that litigants can rely upon a judg-
ment as the final settlement of their dispute,"0 and in enabling
the courts to clear their dockets in order to make room for new
controversies. 41 This profound interest in finality of judgment is
evidenced by a reluctance to recall mandates after rehearing pe-
riods have expired.42
Despite the absence of explicit statutory authority, the
power of a court of appeals to recall its mandate has long been
recognized.48 Most courts of appeals have attributed the power
of recall to the inherent power of a court to exercise control over
its judgments and to protect the integrity of its mandates."
While it is clear that courts of appeals have the power to recall
their mandates, it is not clear when and under what circum-
stances that power will be exercised. Existing precedent con-
cerning the recall of mandate after expiration of the time for
rehearing or certiorari emphasizes that recall of mandate is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly to prevent
the same judges who comprised the majority in the vote to recall the mandate. See note
33 supra.
40. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1977). See
United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 111 (1957)(Harlan, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Harlan stated, "I can think of nothing more unsettling to lawyers and
litigants, and more disturbing to their confidence in the even-handedness of the Court's
processes, than to be left in . . . uncertainty . . . as to when their cases may be con-
sidered finally closed in this Court." Id.
41. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1977).'
42. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944);
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878); American Iron & Steel Inst. v.
EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1977); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d
268, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Hines v. Royal Indemnity
Co., 253 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1958); 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESS-
MAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 3938, at 281-82 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT & MILLER].
43. See United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 98-99 (1957); Bronson v.
Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 415 (1881); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589,
593 (3d Cir. 1977); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 276-77 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
44. E.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1977);
Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 184, 188 (8th Cir. 1976); Aerojet-General Corp. v.
American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC. 463 F.2d 268, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
The court in Greater Boston also found authority for the power of recall in 28 U.S.C. §
2106, which provides that federal appellate courts may require further proceedings "as
may be just under the circumstances." 463 F.2d at 277. From this, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit inferred a grant of power to review its own decisions if such action would be
"just under the circumstances." Id. at 277.
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injustice," for good cause,46 or in special circumstances.4"
In 1971, the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to sum-
marize the existing precedent on recall of mandate in Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion.48 The court stated that the most common reasons for recall
of mandate by appellate courts had been to correct clerical mis-
takes or to make the judgment consistent with the opinion,49 to
clarify an outstanding mandate,50 or to regain a mandate that
was obtained fraudulently.5 The summary also noted that
courts of appeals traditionally have recalled their mandates in
order to revise instructions that would otherwise produce an un-
intended or unjust result.
5 2
In addition, the court in Greater Boston identified two
other circumstances under which recall of mandate would be ap-
propriate. First, significant evidence discovered after issuance of
the mandate would justify recall,53 but only to the extent that
the district court would have been permitted to reopen the case
under Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Second, recall of mandate might be warranted to avoid inconsis-
tent results of several cases pending at the same time. The
court also noted that the timeliness of the motion 6 for recall of
45. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 254
(9th Cir. 1973); Gradsky v. United States, 376 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1967).
46. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 254
(9th Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
47. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1977)(citing Pow-
ers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir. 1973)); Greater Boston Televi-
sion Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
48. 463 F.2d 268, 275-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
49. Id. at 278 (citing Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 296 F.2d 215
(5th Cir. 1961)) (mandate recalled and amended on ground that mandate was inconsis-
tent with full opinion).
50. 463 F.2d at 278 (citing Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1962)). This
reason for recall and amendment of mandate was used recently in Dilley v. Alexander,
603 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1979), motion for clarification filed, No. 77-1789, (D.C. Cir. May
15, 1980).
51. 463 F.2d at 278 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238, 244 (1944)).
52. 463 F.2d at 279.
53. Id. at 279-80.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
55. 463 F.2d at 278-79 (citing United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 99
(1957)).
56. 463 F.2d at 276.
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mandate can be significant, since the recall measure is not to be
employed simply to extend the period allowed for granting a
rehearing. 7
When errors of law are alleged, and petitions for rehearing
or certiorari-the accepted means of seeking review on these
grounds- 58 have previously been denied, recall motions will not
be viewed favorably by some courts.5 9 Subsequent changes in the
substantive law or the court's view of the law also have been
held to be insufficient to justify recall of mandate."'
The Third Circuit, in American Iron & Steel Institute v.
Environmental Protection Agency,61 took a different approach
in considering a motion for recall of mandate. Rather than con-
sidering the request in terms of the recognized factors and then
implicitly weighing that category of justification for recall
against the principle of finality, the court looked at the case as a
whole and expressly weighed all the aspects of the case against
the interest in finality. In granting a motion for recall of its
mandate, the court stressed that its decision was based upon a
combination of factors6 2 rather than on any one ground. Among
the factors that the court balanced against finality was a subse-
quent Supreme Court decision that, while not showing the ap-
pellate court's ruling to be "demonstrably wrong, '6 3 did call into
57. Id. at 277 (citing Estate of Iverson v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d 408, 409 (8th Cir.
1958)). This is especially significant in view of the fact that one of the grounds most
frequently advanced in motions for recall is that the court made an error of law in its
decision of the appeal. Because the correction of such errors is considered the primary
purpose of petition for rehearing or Supreme Court review, such a motion for recall may
be considered nothing more than an untimely petition for rehearing. See, e.g., Hines v.
Royal Indem. Co., 253 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1958)(denying motion filed eight months
after issuance of mandate, since the motion was "obviously" an untimely petition for
rehearing).
58. See note 57 supra.
59. See Legate v. Maloney, 348 F.2d 164, 166 (1st Cir. 1965); Hines v. Royal Indem.
Co., 253 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1958). But see United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S.
98, 99 (1957)(recalling mandate 18 months after Supreme Court denial of petition for
rehearing).
60. See Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir. 1973); Collins
v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958). But see Legate v. Maloney, 348
F.2d 164, 166 (1st Cir. 1965) (dictum)(If a subsequent Supreme Court decision were to
show that the original decision was "demonstrably wrong," a motion to recall that man-
date "might be entertained.").
61. 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977).
62. Id. at 600.
63. See note 60 supra.
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question the overall correctness of the decision." The court also
gave weight to the public interest in intercircuit uniformity in
the administration of a national environmental protection pro-
gram65 and to the relatively slight disruptive effect that the nec-
essary modification to the mandate would have on finality, since
the original decision had imposed a continuing duty on the par-
ties, rather than a money judgment.6 At the time the Fourth
Circuit was considering action on its mandate from the second
in banc rehearing,67 American Iron & Steels8 was the most re-
cent precedent of any importance on the exercise of the recall
power.
III. EXERCISE OF RECALL POWER IN Uzzell v. Friday
In recalling its mandate from the second in banc rehear-
ing,"' the majority avoided serious consideration of the princi-
ples of finality by concluding that the "requirement of nonpar-
ticipation by a senior judge in a rehearing in banc is
jurisdictional. '70 The court based this conclusion on United
States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp.,71 a case concern-
ing section 46(c) of the Judicial Code7 2 when, as now, senior
judges were not allowed to sit on an in banc court. In that case,
the Supreme Court vacated an in banc decision in which a sit-
ting judge took senior status during consideration of the case.
The majority in Uzzell found that American-Foreign Steamship
"compels the conclusion that . . . [the court] . . . should take
steps to remedy ... [its] . . . own oversight.
'73
The majority in Uzzell, however, overlooked that in Ameri-
can-Foreign Steamship the senior judge's authority to sit was
challenged at the time of the in banc hearing,74 not, as in Uzzell,
64. 560 F.2d at 596.
65. Id. at 598.
66. Id. at 599. The court warned that the remedy granted "may well be confined to
instances where litigants are under a continuing duty to satisfy an order of the Court."
Id.
67. Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997 (4th Cir. 1979).
68. 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977).
69. Uzzell v. Friday, 591 F.2d 997 (4th Cir. 1979).
70. Uzzell v. Friday, 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2917 (1980).
71. 363 U.S. 685 (1960).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976). See 625 F.2d at 1120 n.3.
73. 625 F.2d at 1120.
74. Id. at 1125 & n.6 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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after the relevant deadlines for review had passed. Two years
after American-Foreign Steamship, the same Supreme Court
Justices indicated that they considered the decision in that case
to be based not upon jurisdictional issues, but upon a timely
challenge to a judge's authority.7 5 The Court noted that, absent
such a challenge, it is "well settled 'that where there is an office
to be filled and one, acting under color of authority, fills the of-
fice and discharges its duties, his actions are those of an officer
de facto, and binding upon the public.' ,,,6
Hicks v. Miranda7 7 also stands in opposition to the major-
ity's reading of American-Foreign Steamship. In that case, the
Supreme Court stated that it did not deem jurisdictional the re-
quirement of a federal statute7 8 that a particular district court
judge sit on a three-judge court in particular circumstances. 9
Failure to object to the composition of the court before direct
appeal to the Supreme Court was held to constitute waiver of
the objection. 0
The majority in Uzzell attempted to distinguish Hicks on
the ground that American-Foreign Steamship established that
nonparticipation of a senior judge is jurisdictional. This distinc-
tion is unconvincing, since it can be argued forcefully that
American-Foreign Steamship, as it has been construed in subse-
quent cases, does not establish the claimed jurisdictional effect
of an improperly constituted court.81 The court also found that
there could be no waiver of objection to the composition of the
court in the present case, since the court and the parties did not
know that the court was improperly constituted. This view, how-
ever, ignores the fact that defendants never raised the matter,
even after they were informed of the improper composition of
the court in May 1979.82
IV. CONCLUSION
Aside from the jurisdictional issue, which is not conclusively
75. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535 (1962).
76. Id. (quoting McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 602 (1895)).
77. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976).
79. 422 U.S. at 338 n.5.
80. Id.
81. See notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
82. See 625 F.2d at 1125-26 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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established by the majority, little in the circumstances of this
case seems to justify recall of the mandate in question. Under
either the balancing approach of American Iron & Steel Insti-
tute v. Environmental Protecton Agency 83 or the more tradi-
tional doctrines allowing recall of mandate, the profound public
interest in finality in this case should outweigh all other consid-
erations. The parties have been involved in litigation for six
years and now face the prospect of exhaustive relitigation. Al-
though a purpose of recalling a mandate is to prevent injustice, 4
the extent and gravity of the injustice must b6 considered in de-
termining whether a final decision should be disturbed. "[T]he
power to recall a mandate should not be used to destroy finality
and repose simply on the ground that the court of appeals
wrongly decided the case." 85
Nancy R. Jefferis
83. 560 F.2d 589 (1977).
84. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
85. 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 42, § 3938, at 284.
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CRIMINAL LAW-THE SUPREME COURT NARROWS DEFINITION
OF INTERROGATION TO ALLOW ADMISSION OF SOME CUSTODIAL
CONFESSIONS. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis1
presented an analysis and application of a suspect's rights under
the fifth amendment2 and Miranda v. Arizona.3 In the 1966
landmark Miranda decision, a sharply divided Court deter-
mined that incriminating statements made by a suspect during a
custodial interrogation were inadmissible at trial unless the sus-
pect had been informed of his fifth amendment rights.5 The
Court, in delineating the scope of fifth amendment rights, at-
1. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o
person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Justice Clark asserted that there was" 'no significant support' in our cases for the
holding of the Court," id. at 503 n.4 (Clark, J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part) (apparently quoting the majority opinion), and styled the holding as an "arbitrary
Fifth Amendment rule." Id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and White, charged that the decision "re-
present[ed] poor constitutional law and entail[ed] harmful consequences for the country
at large." Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting). Justice
White, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, observed that the majority opinion had
"no significant support in the history of the privilege [against self-incrimination] or in
the language of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 526 (White, J., joined by Harlan and Stew-
art, JJ., dissenting).
5. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, concluded:
[Tihe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination.... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.
Id. at 444. In so holding, the Court reversed State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721
(1965); People v. Vignera, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1965); and
Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965), which had held that failure to
inform defendants of their rights prior to obtaining their confessions did not violate their
rights. The decision affirmed the finding of People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d
97, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1965), that such failure did violate defendant's rights. 384 U.S. at
498.
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tempted to "draw a balance between the individual rights of a
defendant and the interest of society in being protected against
crimes."6 The warnings set forth in Miranda are still required.
Nevertheless, several Supreme Court Justices, in dissenting
opinions, have suggested that the Court is pursuing actively a
course designed to narrow the scope of rights defined by the Mi-
randa decision.8 The Court's decision in Rhode Island v. Innis
adds credence to this contention.9
I. STRUCTURING A DEFINITION OF INTERROGATION IN Innis
A. A Broad View-The State Court's Analysis
In Innis, a Rhode Island taxicab driver, missing for four
days, was found dead from a shotgun blast on January 16, 1975.
On January 17, another taxicab driver reported that he had been
robbed by a man wielding a shotgun. From a photograph on the
bulletin board of the police station, the second driver identified
Innis as his assailant. Several hours later, Innis was arrested and
advised of his Miranda rights. He and the arresting officer
waited at the scene of the arrest without further significant con-
versation until other police officers arrived. A sergeant and a po-
lice captain appeared, each readvising Innis of his rights. Innis
told the captain that he understood his rights and that he
wanted to speak with a lawyer. 10 The police then put Innis in a
police car, in the company of three officers, to be driven to the
stationhouse. The officers were instructed not to question, intim-
idate, or coerce him in any way. While traveling to the station,
two of the officers discussed the missing shotgun. During their
6. Annot., 46 L. Ed. 2d 903, 911 (1976).
7. See e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
8. For example, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), Justice Brennan ob-
served that "the process of eroding Miranda rights, begun with Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 ... (1971), continues with today's holding. 423 U.S. at 112 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated: "This holding represents a plain departure
from the principles set forth in Miranda." 100 S. Ct. at 1694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. 100 S. Ct. at 1686. Innis' request for a lawyer constituted an assertion of his
right to counsel under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 1688 (citing Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444). Although the right to counsel is also guaranteed by the sixth
and fourteenth amendments, the Court stated that Innis' right was not based on those
amendments. Id. at 1689 n.4. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of this distinction,
see text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
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brief conversation, no part of which was directly addressed to
Innis, one of the officers observed that because there was a
school for handicapped children in the neighborhood, he feared
that one of the children might find the shotgun and injure him-
self.11 At that point, having traveled no more than a mile from
the scene of the arrest, Innis interrupted and told the officers
that he would show them the location of the shotgun. The of-
ficers again advised Innis of his Miranda rights, and he replied
that he understood those rights, but "wanted to get the gun out
of the way because of the kids . ,, He then led police to the
gun.
Innis was later indicted for kidnapping, robbery, and mur-
der. The trial court sustained the admissibility of the shotgun
and Innis' incriminating statements, noting that he had been
"repeatedly and completely advised of his Miranda rights" and
had intelligently waived them.13 At trial, Innis was convicted on
all counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island va-
cated the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
14
Relying on "[t]he expansion of the concept of interrogation...
recently ... undertaken by the United States Supreme
Court,"1 5 the Rhode Island court found that Innis had been in-
terrogated absent any waiver of his right against self-incrimina-
tion." The court explained:
We do not accept the argument that Officer Gleckman's re-
marks do not constitute interrogation because he was expres-
sing only a concern for public safety and not intentionally at-
tempting to solicit evidence of an incriminating nature....
Public safety,. . . certainly a subject foremost in the mind of a
police officer, nevertheless must not be permitted to become a
vehicle for violating a suspect's consitutional rights.
11. The officer may have used the emotionally charged words "God forbid" and his
reference may have been to a little girl. See 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87.
12. Id. at 1687.
13. This language apparently appeared in the trial transcript of the Motion for New
Trial and Sentencing. The transcript was included as part of the petition. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island at 33a-34a,
quoted in 100 S. Ct. at 1687.
14. State v. Innis, - R.I. -, -' 391 A.2d 1158, 1167 (1978).
15. Id. at -, 391 A.2d at 1161 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)). For
a discussion of the applicability of Brewer to Innis, see text accompanying notes 39-48
infra.
16. - R.I. at -, 391 A.2d at 1162-63.
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We also reject the contention that no interrogation oc-
curred because defendant was not addressed personally ...
Police officers. . must not be permitted to achieve indirectly,
by talking with one another, a result which the Supreme Court
has said they may not achieve directly by talking to a suspect
who has been ordered not to respond. The same "subtle com-
pulsion" exists.
1
7
The state court further observed that "[t]here is no evidence in
the record . . . indicating that defendant affirmatively waived
his fifth amendment rights at this time other than the fact that
he ultimately agreed to assist the police in locating the incrimi-
nating evidence" 18 and concluded that "the weapon and any evi-
dence leading to its discovery must be suppressed as 'fruit of the
poisonous tree.' "19
B. A Narrower View-Supreme Court Finds No
Interrogation
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and remanded the case.
Noting that no question existed that respondent had been fully
informed of his Miranda rights, that he had invoked his right to
counsel at the time of the arrest, and that he was "in custody"
while being transported to the police station,20 the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether respondent had been " 'interro-
gated' by the police officers in violation of. . . [his] undisputed
right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted
17. Id. at -, 391 A.2d at 1162. The term "subtle compulsion" comes from
Miranda:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the indi-
vidual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that
he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease .... [Any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product
of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
18. - R.I. at -, 391 A.2d at 1163-64.
19. Id. at -, 391 A.2d at 1164 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963)).
20. 100 S. Ct. at 1688. Miranda defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initi-
ated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. For a discus-
sion of custodial interrogation, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).
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with a lawyer. '21 The Court first pointed to the Miranda defini-
tion of "custodial interrogation, 22 which contained the word
"questioning," and observed that "[t]his passage and other ref-
erences throughout the [Miranda] opinion to 'questioning'
might suggest that the Miranda rules were to apply only to
those police interrogation practices that involve express ques-
tioning of a defendant while in custody. '23 Nevertheless, the
Court believed a broader construction of interrogation was ap-
propriate because certain "techniques of persuasion, no less than
express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to
amount to interrogation" if they reflected "a measure of compul-
sion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.
24
The Court explained that
the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its func-
tional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation"
under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also
to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from the suspect .... [T]he definition of interrogation
can extend only to words or actions on the part of the police
officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response.2
5
Thus, the Court set forth two tests to determine what consti-
tutes interrogation under the fifth amendment: (1) express ques-
tioning, or (2) its functional equivalent, that is, words or actions
that the police should know are likely to elicit a response. The
Court further elaborated on its standard by defining an incrimi-
nating response as "any response-whether inculpatory or excul-
21. 100 S. Ct. at 1688. As Chief Justice Warren explained in Miranda:
[Tihe need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends
not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present.
384 U.S. at 470-74.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. 100 S. Ct. at 1688.
24. Id. at 1689.
25. Id. at 1689-90 (footnotes omitted).
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patory-that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.126
It observed that "where a police practice is designed to elicit an
incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the
practice will not also be one which the police should have known
was reasonably likely to have that effect. '2 7
Based on its explanation of interrogation, the Court held
that respondent had not been interrogated within the meaning
of Miranda because the conversation between the officers that
resulted in the respondent's incriminating statements neither in-
cluded express questioning nor subjected Innis to the functional
equivalent of questioning.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were
aware that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an ap-
peal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped
children. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that
the police knew that the respondent was unusually disoriented
or upset at the time of his arrest.
... Given the fact that the entire conversation appears to
have consisted of no more than a few off-hand remarks, we
cannot say that the officers should have known that it was rea-
sonably likely that Innis would so respond."
Admitting that respondent, in fact, may have been subjected to
"subtle compulsion," the Court criticized the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court's reasoning in equating subtle compulsion with in-
terrogation and explained that, in order to constitute interroga-
tion, subtle compulsion must result from words or actions that
the police knew or "should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response ... ."I' The Court agreed with
the trial judge's observation that "it was 'entirely understanda-
ble that [the officers] would voice their concern [for the safety of
the handicapped children] to each other.'-8 The Court found
no basis in the record to conclude that the police knew or should
26. Id. at 1689 n.5.
27. Id. at 1690 n.7.
28. Id. at 1690.91.
29. Id. at 1691.
30. Id. at 1690 n.9 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the State of Rhode Island at 33a-34a). The trial judge made this statement at the
hearing on a Motion for a New Trial and Sentencing. A portion of the transcript of this
hearing appeared in the Petition for Certiorari.
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have known the impact of their remarks. 1 Because the Court
found that respondent had not been interrogated under Mi-
randa, it did not reach the question of whether Innis had waived
his Miranda right to be free from interrogation until counsel was
present.
32
II. THE COURT LIMITS PROTECTION AFFORDED SUSPECTS
The Innis decision can be characterized more accurately as
pragmatic law than as principled law.3 3 First, the Court adopted
an unexplained and apparently artificial distinction between the
definitions of interrogation under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments and under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
This distinction creates tension with the Court's earlier decision
in Brewer v. Williams3 4 by reaching a different result on very
similar facts. Second, the Court structured a test for interroga-
tion, which effectively predicates the determination of whether
or not a suspect's rights have been violated on the testimony of
those who may have violated those rights. These two points are
inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions and suggest a view
that conflicts with the aims of Miranda.
A. Brewer v. Williams Distinguished on Constitutional
Grounds
1. Sixth Amendment Interrogation Under Brewer.-In
Brewer, respondent Williams, an escapee from a mental hospital,
surrendered to police in Davenport, Iowa, on advice he received
by telephone from his attorney in Des Moines. He was arrested
and arraigned on a charge of kidnapping a ten-year-old girl and
31. 100 S. Ct. at 1690.
32. Id. at 1688 n.2. A majority of the Court thus far has been unable to reach agree-
ment on when a suspect has voluntarily waived his rights. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist are prepared to find that a waiver is voluntary
whenever a suspect in custody knows and understands his rights, but, nevertheless,
makes incriminating responses. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 417-18 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 434 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
The remaining Justices have not yet subscribed to this view.
33. Professor Grano explains that principled decisions are those supported by rea-
sons and consistent with decisions in similar cases. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need
to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 1, 3 n.15 (1979).
34. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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was advised of his rights. During a second telephone conference,
Williams' attorney informed him that the police had agreed not
to interrogate him during the trip back to Des Moines and that
he should not talk with them. A Davenport attorney, appointed
to represent Williams at his arraignment, likewise advised him
to make no statement before conferring with his attorney in Des
Moines and reminded police officers of their agreement to re-
frain from interrogation during the trip. The officers refused the
Davenport attorney's request to accompany Williams on the trip
to Des Moines. During the 160-mile drive, Williams stated sev-
eral times that he would tell the whole story when he reached
Des Moines. At least one of the officers knew Williams had been
a mental patient and was deeply religious. Not long after leaving
Davenport, that officer spoke directly to Williams, emphasizing
that the victim's" 'parents. . . should be entitled to a Christian
burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on
Christmas [E]ve and murdered.' "85 As the journey progressed,
Williams made a series of incriminating statements and ulti-
mately led the officers to the body. These statements were ad-
mitted at trial, Williams was convicted, and the conviction was
affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court. Williams subsequently pe-
titioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court ruled
that the incriminating statements had been wrongly admitted.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and denied
rehearing.3 Finding the Christian burial speech "tantamount to
interrogation, '37 the United States Supreme Court agreed with
the court of appeals that Williams' sixth and fourteenth amend-
ment right to counsel had been violated and affirmed that
court's judgment.38
2. The Court's Effort to Distinguish Fifth Amendment In-
terrogation.-In both Brewer and Innis, the suspects were taken
into custody and advised of their rights. Each requested counsel,
and each subsequently made incriminating statements in re-
sponse to remarks by police officers. In Brewer, the remarks by
the police were held to constitute interrogation in violation of
the suspect's rights, while in Innis, the remarks were found not
35. Id. at 393 (quoting the officer's statement to the defendant).
36. Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1975).
37. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400 (1977).
38. Id. at 406.
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to be interrogation and thus not in violation of the suspect's
rights. 9 The Court in Innis attempted to distinguish Brewer on
the ground that the Brewer interrogation occurred after Wil-
liams' arraignment. Thus, the Brewer decision "rested solely on
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. '40 In
contrast, the officers' conversation that resulted in Innis' incrim-
inating statements occurred prior to his arraignment, and the
Court, simply noting that custody is not a controlling factor in
the attachment of the sixth and fourteenth amendment right,
concluded that "the right to counsel at issue in . . . [Innis] is
based not on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, but rather
on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in the
Miranda opinion. ' 41 The Court explained that "[t]he definitions
of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . .
are not necessarily interchangeable.. ,2 but offered no expla-
nation of how the definitions might differ.
Paradoxically, following its statement that Brewer was not
controlling in fifth amendment cases, the Court in Innis pro-
39. The Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized the similarity and adopted the rea-
soning of Brewer on interrogation and waiver. - R.I. at , 391 A.2d at 1162-64. More-
over, Chief Justice Burger recognized tension between the holdings of Innis and Brewer,
100 S. Ct. at 1691 (Burger, C.J., concurring), and Justice Stevens argued in his dissent
that Innis' "invocation of his right to counsel. . . [made] the two cases indistinguish-
able." Id. at 1694 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
41. Id. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court explained that "[i]t
would exalt form over substance to make the [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel...
depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal
indictment," id. at 486, and held that once an investigation has begun to focus on a
particular suspect and that suspect is in custody, sixth amendment rights attach. Id. at
490-91. Later, however, the plurality in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), referred to
Escobedo as a "seeming deviation" and found that the sixth amendment right attaches
at or after arraignment. Id. at 698.
In Brewer v. Williams, the Court noted that
[t]here has occasionally been a difference of opinion within the Court as to
the peripheral scope of ... [the Sixth Amendment] right .... Whatever else
it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or
after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him---"whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, in-
formation, or arraignment."
430 U.S. at 398. By failing to explain its conclusion that Innis' right to counsel was not
based on the sixth and fourteenth amendments, the Court let pass an opportunity to
shed further light on the point at which the right to counsel attaches.
42. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
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ceeded to incorporate concerns that arose in Brewer into its
guidelines for the application of the functional-equivalent test
for fifth amendment interrogation. In Brewer, the respondent
was known to police as a former mental patient and a deeply
religious individual. The Court in Innis pointed out that "[a]ny
knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual sus-
ceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion
might be an important factor in determining whether the police
should have known that their words or actions were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 4 3
Furthermore, testimony in Brewer showed that the detective
who delivered the Christian burial speech had hoped to elicit a
response from the prisoner. The Court in Innis, again unmistak-
ably cognizant of the Brewer shadow, submitted that "where a
police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response
from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be
one which the police should have known would have that ef-
fect."4 4 These efforts to tailor the Innis definition of interroga-
tion to accommodate concerns that arose in Brewer, following
closely at the heels of the Court's statement that Brewer was not
controlling, suggest that the Court may have been more inter-
ested in putting distance between the two decisions than in pur-
suing and clarifying the constitutional distinction it had drawn.
Innis presented the Court with a serious dilemma. In
Brewer, a finding that remarks designed to elicit a response and
directed to a suspect were "tantamount to interrogation" 45 ap-
pears to have been influenced strongly by the Court's disposition
to protect the rights of that respondent: "so clear a violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as here occurred cannot
be condoned. '46 As a consequence, Brewer appeared to broaden
considerably the definition of interrogation, leaving aside the
question whether definitions of interrogation under the fifth and
sixth amendments are interchangeable. Yet Miranda "[did] not
purport to find all confessions inadmissible. '47 Thus, in the wake
of Brewer, the Court was faced with the choice between finding
43. Id. at 1690 n.8.
44. Id. at 1690 n.7.
45. 430 U.S. at 400.
46. Id. at 406.
47. 384 U.S. at 478.
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all custodial confessions made in the absence of counsel inad-
missible or identifying some exchanges between law enforcement
officers and suspects as falling short of "interrogation."
Perhaps the absence of a clear violation of constitutional
rights as in Brewer'8 impelled the Court to devise a test under
which the Innis conversation would not constitute interrogation.
The result was a test for interrogation under the fifth amend-
ment which, following the bald settlement that Brewer was not
controlling, inexplicably incorporated concerns that arose in
Brewer, but, when applied, reached the opposite conclusion.
B. Retreat From Miranda Restrictions on Police Practices
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity in the Court's reasoning
in Innis,49 law enforcement practices must be adjusted to the
interpretation in Innis of the constitutional rights of suspects.50
Miranda definitively brought confessions within the scope of the
fifth amendment by requiring that, prior to any questioning, a
suspect had to be warned of his rights and by further providing
that, if he chose to exercise those rights, all questioning had to
stop.5 1 The Court, in Michigan v. Mosley, 2 explained that inter-
48. In Brewer, respondent retained two attorneys and received their advice. More-
over, one of the attorneys extracted an agreement from the police that they would re-
frain from interrogation, and the other attorney was denied permission to accompany
respondent. See text preceding note 35 supra. In contrast, Innis merely stated that he
wanted to see an attorney.
49. The Court has muddied fifth and sixth amendment waters on several occasions.
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Innis, feared that the majority opinion, based on
fifth and fourteenth amendment rights, created tension with Brewer, based on sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights. 100 S. Ct. at 1691 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice
White, dissenting in Brewer, indicated that it was not necessary to distinguish between
the amendments when addressing the waiver issue. 430 U.S. at 430 n.1 (White, J., dis-
senting). Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, stated
that "the standards of Johnson [v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (a sixth amendment
case)] were ... found to be a necessary prerequisite to a finding of a valid waiver [of
fifth amendment Miranda rights]." 412 U.S. 218, 240 (1973). Law enforcement agencies
cannot respond effectively to distinctions which the Court has failed to make clear.
50. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Innis, acknowledges the adjustment made in
law enforcement practices to conform to the strictures of Miranda. 100 S. Ct. at 1691
(Burger, C.J., concurring). Indeed, the Court granted certiorari in the cases decided in
Miranda to "give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and the
courts to follow." 384 U.S. at 441-42.
51. See notes 5 & 17 supra.
52. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In Mosley, after respondent was arrested in connection with
certain robberies and advised of his rights, he declined to discuss the robberies and in-
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rogation, terminated at a suspect's request, could resume "after
the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a
fresh set of warnings" as long as the second interrogation in-
volved a "crime that had not been a subject of the earlier inter-
rogation."5 3 In Brewer, the Court held that remarks designed to
elicit a response and addressed directly to the suspect consti-
tuted interrogation. This finding was influenced by the fact that
the police knew of the suspect's peculiar susceptibilities to the
remarks.5 Brewer, therefore, suggested that police should avoid
addressing statements to their suspects and, likewise, discour-
aged law enforcement agents from admitting that statements
made by them were designed to elicit a response. In the wake of
Brewer, police also may be disinclined to reveal their knowledge
of a suspect's peculiar susceptibilities. The police officers in In-
nis demonstrated at least coincidental conformity, if not consci-
entious adherence, to the standards of the foregoing decisions:
Miranda warnings were given and repeated; the officers' remarks
were not directly addressed to the suspect; "[t]he record in no
way suggest[ed] that the officers' remarks were designed to elicit
a response;" 5 and there was "nothing in the record to suggest
terrogation ceased. More than two hours later, another officer, after once again advising
respondent of his rights, questioned him about an unrelated murder and obtained an
incriminating statement. Noting that Miranda could not "sensibly be read to create a
per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police
officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain si-
lent," id. at 102-03, the Court found no violation of respondent's rights. Id. at 107. Al-
though the police conversation in Innis occurred after respondent had elected to exercise
his rights, the Court's finding that the conversation was not interrogation made consider-
ation of the issue addressed by Mosley unnecessary.
53. Id. at 106.
54. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
55. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.9. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, disputed this contention
noting that
there is evidence in the record to support the view that Officer Gleckman's
statement was intended to elicit a response from Innis. Officer Gleckman, who
was not regularly assigned to the caged wagon, was directed by a police captain
to ride with respondent to the police station. Although there is a dispute in the
testimony, it appears that Gleckman may well have been riding in the back
seat with Innis. The record does not explain why, notwithstanding the fact
that respondent was handcuffed, unarmed, and had offered no resistance when
arrested by an officer acting alone, the captain ordered Officer Gleckman to
ride with respondent. It is not inconceivable that two professionally trained
police officers. . . might induce respondent to disclose the whereabouts of the
shotgun. This conclusion becomes even more plausible in light of the emotion-
ally charged words chosen by Officer Gleckman ....
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that the officers were aware that the respondent was peculiarly
susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety
of handicapped children" or that he "was unusually disoriented
or upset at the time of his arrest.""6
Confronted with the Innis test for interrogation, law en-
forcement officers need make no adjustment for express ques-
tioning because such questioning of a suspect after he has in-
voked his rights is forbidden by Miranda.57 On the other hand,
the opportunity for adjustment does arise regarding the func-
tional equivalent of questioning. While police probably should
continue to refrain from addressing remarks directly to suspects
in custody who have invoked their rights, Innis appears to allow
wide-ranging conversations to be carried on in the suspect's
presence: only those "words or actions . . . that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse" are prohibited.58 The Court, however, offered a paradox-
ical explanation of this prohibition, noting that it
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather
than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that
the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in cus-
tody with an added measure of protection against coercive po-
lice practices, without regard to objective proof of the underly-
ing intent of the police.... But, since the police surely cannot
be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words
or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to
words or actions on the part of police officers that they should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. 9
Thus, although the test for the functional equivalent of interro-
gation purports to focus "primarily on the perceptions of the
suspect," the Court itself admitted that the police cannot be
held accountable for what suspects may perceive, and the test
effectively shifted the focus back to the police. Consequently, in
order to prove that certain words or actions were designed to
elicit a response and therefore constitute interrogation, a suspect
Id. at 1697 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 1690 (footnote omitted).
57. See note 17 supra.
58. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
59. Id. at 1690 (emphasis in original).
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is left with only two alternatives: (1) he must depend upon the
police officers to admit at trial that their words or acts, in fact,
were designed to elicit a response, or (2) he must prove by other
evidence that the words or actions were so designed. To expect
the former is unrealistic, and the latter places a heavy burden on
the suspect in contravention of a recognized goal. of Miranda.6
As Justice Stevens said in his dissent to Innis,
the Court's test creates an incentive for police to ignore a sus-
pect's invocation of his rights in order to make continued at-
tempts to extract information from him. If a suspect does not
appear to be susceptible to a particular type of psychological
pressure, the police are apparently free to exert that pressure
on him despite his request for counsel, so long as they are care-
ful not to punctuate their statements with question marks.
And if, contrary to all reasonable expectations, the suspect
makes an incriminating statement, that statement can be used
against him at trial. 1
Arguably, then, the Innis test for interrogation allows law en-
forcement agents to employ procedures and achieve results that
Miranda was designed to prohibit.
III. CONCLUSION
Miranda's prophylactic rule has produced controversy
among judges, law enforcement officers, and the public.6 2 In bal-
ancing the rights of a suspect against the public policy of crime
prevention,6" the court in Innis found the public interest more
compelling and sought to allow the admission of some custodial
confessions. Yet, in what may have been its effort to avoid the
issue of waiver," the court reached a pragmatic decision that
clouds rather than clarifies distinctions between the fifth and
sixth amendments. Furthermore, Innis contravenes the Court's
earlier decision in Miranda v. Arizona65 by effectively allocating
60. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
62. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1964).
63. See Annot., 46 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1976).
64. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
65, See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
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to the suspect the burden of showing that the police violated his
rights.
Philip D. Porter
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FEDERAL PRACTICE-RuLE 3 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES NOT DETERMINE COMMENCEMENT OF A Di-
VERSITY ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF TOLLING A STATE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S. Ct. 1978
(1980).
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,' the United States Su-
preme Court held that in a diversity action state law determines
when an action is commenced for purposes of tolling a state stat-
ute of limitations.2 The Supreme Court declared that rule 3 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that filing of
a complaint commences an action,3 was not intended either to
toll a state statute of limitations or to displace state tolling
rules.4
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiff in Walker was injured on August 22, 1975, in
Oklahoma, by an allegedly defective nail manufactured by the
nonresident defendant. Plaintiff filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on August
19, 1977.1 Summons was issued the same day, but remained in
the possession of plaintiff's counsel6 until December 1, 1977, at
which time the United States Marshal received and served it.
On January 5, 1978, defendant, contending that the action was
barred by the applicable Oklahoma two-year statute of limita-
tions, fied a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the
1. 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980).
2. Id. at 1986. The Supreme Court did not rule on the effect of rule 3 in a federal
question action. The Court noted, however, that it had suggested in another case: "[I]n
suits to enforce rights under a federal statute Rule 3 means that filing of the complaint
tolls the applicable statute of limitations." Id. at 1985 n.11 (citing Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949)). Yet, the Court further said: "We
do not here address the role of Rule 3 as a tolling provision ... if the cause of action is
based on federal law." 100 S. Ct. at 1985 n.11.
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 3. This rule states: "A civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court." Id.
4. 100 S. Ct. at 1985. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
5. 100 S. Ct. at 1981.
6. Id. at 1981 n.2. The reasons for the delay in delivery are unclear. Id.
7. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 1979-80).
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's ruling,9 finding that plaintiff, by failing to comply
with the Oklahoma statute prescribing the procedure for com-
mencing an action,10 had not tolled the statute of limitations.1
State law required either service of summons or a diligent effort
to effectuate service, followed by service of summons within
sixty days, to commence an action. 2 The court of appeals con-
strued the Oklahoma commencement statute to be a limitation,
as well as a filing, provision. 5 Failure to comply with its provi-
sions within the limitations period resulted in a failure to toll
the statute of limitations. The action, therefore, was barred in
state court. According to the court,1 4 it hence was barred in fed-
eral court, despite compliance with federal rule 3, under the Su-
preme Court's decision in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co.18
Ragan was similar in facts and issues to Walker and, like
Walker, had originated in the Tenth Circuit." In Ragan, the Su-
preme Court held that, in a diversity action, a state statute of
limitations that would have barred suit in state court also barred
suit in federal court, even though the suit had been properly
8. 452 F. Supp. 243, 245 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
9. 592 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir. 1979).
10. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 97 (West Supp. 1979-80). This section provides in
part:
An action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article, as to
each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him ....
Where service by publication is proper, the action shall be deemed commenced
at the date of first publication. An attempt to commence an action shall be
deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof,. . . when the party faith-
fully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt
must be followed by the first publication or service of the summons.., within
sixty (60) days.
Id. (footnote omitted). Commencement of a civil action also may be effectuated through
the clerk of court. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 151 (West Supp. 1979-80).
11. 592 F.2d at 1134-35.
12. Id. at 1134.
13. Id. at 1135.
14. See id. at 1135-36.
15. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). In Ragan, the injury occurred October 1, 1943; complaint
was filed and summons issued September 7, 1945; and service ultimately was effectuated
December 28, 1945. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170 F.2d 987, 988-99
(10th Cir. 1948).
16. See Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170 F.2d 987, 987-89 (10th
Cir. 1948).
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commenced in the latter court under federal rule 3; to hold oth-
erwise, said the Court, would give the cause of action longer life
than the state intended.
17
The vitality of the holding in Ragan had been in dispute
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v.
Plumer.1 8 In Hanna, the federal rule prescribing the manner in
which process was to be served was in direct conflict with a state
rule.19 This conflict, according to the Supreme Court, threatened
the goal of uniform federal procedure since application of vary-
ing state laws in federal actions would result in disparate proce-
dure among the federal courts.2 0 The Court resolved the conflict
by declaring that a 'federal rule of civil procedure that directly
collided with a state rule would govern if it violated neither the
Constitution nor the Rules Enabling Act 21 under which the rules
were promulgated.2
The majority in Hanna distinguished Ragan as a case in
which the federal rule in question was insufficiently broad in
scope to raise a direct conflict with and to compel displacement
of the state rule. 3 Justice Harlan, concurring in the result of
Hanna, however, questioned whether Ragan was still good law
and stated that he thought Ragan had been decided wrongly.2
4
Thus, after Hanna, federal courts were confronted with an un-
certain precedent when called upon to determine whether a di-
versity action had been commenced by a plaintiff who had com-
17. 337 U.S. at 533-34.
18. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See C. WPGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
245 (1970).
19. See 380 U.S. at 470. At issue was rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
20. 380 U.S. at 463.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). The section provides in part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ....
Id.
22. 380 U.S. at 463-64.
23. See id. at 470. The Court in Hanna did not distinguish Ragan expressly on this
point; instead, the Court, in its discussion of the application of the federal rule, cited
Ragan twice. See id. at 469 n.10, 470 n.12. The Walker decision, however, makes this
express distinction. See 100 S. Ct. at 1984-85.
24. 380 U.S. at 476-77 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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plied with rule 3, but had failed to comply with a state tolling
rule requiring service within a prescribed period. Some lower
courts held rule 3 to be controlling under Hanna, while others
followed Ragan.25
The Tenth Circuit, in deciding Walker, considered the issue
before it to be "one of pure procedure" that would have permit-
ted application of the federal rule in accordance with the Hanna
analysis.20 Yet, the court reluctantly followed Ragan. "The
Oklahoma statute which we consider, however, is indistinguish-
able from the statute which was construed in Ragan, so even if
we were desirous of applying Rule 3, which we are, we are not
free to do So. ''2 The court of appeals disclaimed "any spirit of
criticism" in its comments, but indicated no reason for its pref-
erence for rule 3.28 The court, however, further noted: "The Su-
preme Court would perform a great service if it were to clear
away the dilemma which exists as a result of the conflict be-
tween Ragan and Hanna."2 9
The Supreme Court granted Walker's writ of certiorari to
resolve the disagreement among the federal courts of appeals 0
resulting from Ragan and Hanna. Reaffirming the vitality of
Ragan, the Supreme Court affirmed without dissent the Tenth
Circuit's decision that the state statute was controlling.
31
II. ANALYSIS UNDER Erie AND York
A. The Reasoning of the Court
The Supreme Court's decision in Walker was predicated on
the absence of a direct conffict between rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the state tolling rule.32 The Court
found no indication that rule 3 had been intended to function as
a tolling provision, and hence, found it insufficiently broad to
25. For a detailed list of those conflicting decisions, see 100 S. Ct. at 1982 n.6; C.
WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 246 nn.38 & 40.
26. See 592 F.2d at 1135.
27. Id. at 1136.
28. Id. The court of appeals may have preferred rule 3 in the interest of preserving
uniform application of the federal rules. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 463.
29. 592 F.2d at 1136.
30. See 100 S. Ct. at 1982.
31. Id. at 1986.
32. See id. at 1985-86.
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control the issue.3 The Court, therefore, did not test the validity
of rule 3 by the standards of the Enabling Act as it had tested
the federal rule at issue in Hanna." Finding no direct conflict,
the Court analyzed the issue under the principles it had applied
in Ragan. 5
These principles, expressed in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins"6
and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,37 were designed to avoid "ineq-
uitable administration of the laws"38 and forum shopping39 by
achieving a "degree of conformity" that would prevent applica-
tion of law in federal diversity actions differing from the law
that would be applied in state court.40 Although the Supreme
Court acknowledged that a forum-shopping problem might not
be created in Walker if rule 3 were held applicable, it deter-
mined that "the result would be an 'inequitable administration'
of the law.' 1 The Court reasoned that if a plaintiff were able to
toll the statute of limitations by filing in federal court without
subsequent effectuation of service within sixty days of the issu-
ance of summons, the limitations period could be extended be-
yond the stipulated statutory maximum. The effect would be to
give life to a cause of action in federal court beyond that con-
templated by the state legislature for the same cause of action in
state court.42 According to the Court, a difference in state and
federal rules' 3 must not extend the "life"" of a cause of action
in federal court when that action would be prohibited in state
33. Id. at 1985. The Court based this finding on the absence of language in rule 3
providing that it would toll a state statute of limitations and on what the Court inter-
preted as the neutral stance of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure with
regard to the question. Id. at 1985 n.10.
34. See id. at 1984-85.
35. See id. at 1982-83.
36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The finding in Erie promotes a uniform application of state
substantive law in both federal and state courts. Id.
37. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The decision in York requires a materially similar outcome
of an action whether in state or federal court. Id.
38. 380 U.S. at 468.
39. Id.
40. See McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L.
REV. 884, 890 (1965). See also Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693,
712 (1974).
41. 100 S. Ct. at 1986 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 468).
42. See 100 S. Ct. at 1983 (the, Court's reasoning discussed in the context of Ragan).
43. Id. at 1983, 1986.
44. Id. at 1983.
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court.
B. A Criticism of the Erie-York Analysis
Inherent in the decision45 was a concern that a substantial
difference in outcome, as discussed in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 46 would result.47 If a suit were allowed to continue in fed-
eral court after it had been barred in state court, a different out-
come could result, according to the Court. Plaintiff could win in
federal court, but, having no state forum, he would have no re-
covery in state court.48 It is questionable, however, whether ap-
plication of rule 3 always would be unfairly outcome determina-
tive in the sense contemplated by York." If access to state court
is barred before any attempt is made to commence the action in
federal court, a federal rule sustaining the action materially ex-
tends the limitations period and unfairly affects the result.
When compliance with both state and federal commencement
requirements is still possible at the time the action is instituted,
however, and plaintiff selects the federal forum, the outcome is
not determined unfairly, arguably, by filing in federal rather
than in state court.50
Similarly, the giving of "longer life in federal court," 51 which
the Court declared incompatible with the principle of Erie,52 is
45. The Court's opinion analyzed Erie, York, and Ragan individually. Id. at 1982-
83. In its determination of the result in Walker, the Court failed to apply the facts of
Walker to the principles expressed in Erie and York. This failure to apply the facts of
Walker to Erie and York can be interpreted to mean only that the Court applied the
principles of those cases through its recognition that "the present case is indistinguish-
able from Ragan." Id. at 1984.
46. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
47. See note 37 supra.
48. 100 S. Ct. at 1982 (discussing York).
49. Cf. McCoid, supra note 40, at 901 (stating that Hanna clearly made an "unfair
difference in outcome ... rather than mere difference in outcome ... relevant"). In
York, the state statute of limitations had run before plaintiff attempted to commence
the action in federal court. At issue was whether doctrines applicable in federal equity
proceedings permitted a federal court to disregard the expired statutory period; the com-
mencement function of rule 3 was not pertinent to that issue. York v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 143 F.2d 503, 521-28 (2d Cir. 1944).
50. See Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 606 (1968). See also Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 467-69.
51. 100 S. Ct. at 1983.
52. The analysis of Ragan is made applicable to Walker by the Court's identifica-
tion of the two cases as similar. Id. at 1984. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Ware-
house Co., 337 U.S. at 533-34.
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debatably not of the same magnitude of unfairness as proscribed
by Erie.5" When compliance with state commencement require-
ments is still possible at the time of filing in federal court, an
extension of the sixty-day grace period for service does not re-
sult in an increase in the time within which to initiate the ac-
tion. Rather, the extension results only in a delay in the time
before which defendant would be notified by service that the ac-
tion had been commenced. Extension of the sixty-day grace pe-
riod is not necessarily an abrogation of the two-year statutory
period nor necessarily inequitable to defendant if timely service
is otherwise ensured.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW FAVORING THE Hanna ANALYSIS
A. Reaching the Hanna Analysis-Rule 3 as a Tolling
Provision
Although under the circumstances of the two cases, the
Walker and Ragan results may be correct," the decisions estab-
lish a general rule that impairs the goal of uniform federal pro-
cedure. The decisions are problematic; not only do they render
the commencement of a diversity suit more complex because of
different state tolling rules, but the Court eschews the standards
of the Enabling Act as the gauge for the legitimacy of rule 3.
Application of those standards, which provided the basis of the
Hanna decision, had been suggested by the Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Civil Procedure as a possible test for the appli-
cability of rule 3.5 Instead, the Court chose to base its opinion,
53. Cf. Ely, supra note 40, at 712-13; McCoid, supra note 40, at 889-90. Although
Professor McCoid expresses no opinion on the correctness of the Ragan decision, Mc-
Coid, supra note 40, at 893, Professor Ely believes the result may have been correct. Ely,
supra note 40, at 730. For a discussion of a case exemplifying the inequities giving rise to
the Erie goal of uniformity, see Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw.
U.L. REV. 541, 590-92 (1958); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the
Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1950).
54. See Ely, supra note 40, at 720 n.147, 730. Professor Ely thinks "a strong argu-
ment can be made," id. at 730, that the result in Ragan was correct, although its ratio-
nale was erroneous; Ragan "should have been treated as an Enabling Act case." Id.
55. While noting that the Advisory Committee had foreseen the issue that arose in
Walker, as in Ragan, the Court nevertheless did not address the issue in the manner
that the Advisory Committee suggested. The Court did not examine "whether it is com-
petent exercising the power to make rules of procedure ... [under the mandate of the
Enabling Act] without affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of
limitations." RULES OF CIVnL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
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in part, upon a test of outcome determination, the test upon
which it had refused to rely in Hanna.56 An analysis under
Hanna, even with a finding that application of the federal rule
would impair substantive state rights and thus still not be per-
mitted,57 would have been more persuasive and consistent with
the mandate of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than the
analysis that the rule violated the policies of Erie and York.
It was observed prior to Walker that "[p]erhaps the day will
come when the Court will inter Ragan; there will be few mourn-
ers." '58 In Walker, the Court had the opportunity to declare that
rule 3 served a tolling purpose and to employ a Hanna analysis,
which might have resulted in the overruling of Ragan. Instead,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Ragan and concluded that rule 3
did not toll the state statute of limitations because the rule did
not explicitly indicate that such was its purpose.5 9 The Court
noted that in diversity actions the only purpose of rule 3 is to
"[govern] the date from which various timing requirements of
the federal rules begin to run,"60 although it explicitly left open
the possibility that the rule could act as a tolling provision in an
action based on federal law.61
A persuasive argument for applying rule 3 as a tolling rule
in some diversity actions, however, has been made previously by
the United States District Court for the District of Montana:
I think that when the complaint was filed the statute of limita-
tions was tolled and remained tolled notwithstanding the fail-
ure to serve the summons with diligence....
I prefer the certainty which a literal application of Rule 3
brings to limitations problems to the uncertainty created by a
read-in requirement that there be reasonable diligence in the
service of process. I think that a failure to serve process should
be treated as a failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).12
STATES, NOTES TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 221-22 (1939). See 100 S. Ct. at 1985
n.10.
66. See 380 U.S. at 446-67.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
58. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1057, at 191
(1969).
59. 100 S. Ct. at 1985 n.10.
60. Id. at 1985. Presumably, the timing requirements referred to are those found in
rules 13(a), 26(a), 33, and 56.
61. See note 2 supra.
62. McCrea v. General Motors Corp., 53 F.R.D. 384, 385 (D. Mont. 1971) (footnote
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The court in that case applied rule 3 as a tolling provision when
state law barred all actions not "commenced" within a specified
time.6 s
Adoption by the Court in Walker of the view that rule 3 is a
tolling provision would have given a consistent purpose to the
rule in all federal court actions, whether based on diversity of
parties or federal law, and would have left the effectuation of
timely service for proper enforcement under other applicable
rules. Had the Supreme Court viewed rule 3 as implicitly a toll-
ing provision, the rule, of course, would have been in direct con-
flict with the state tolling provisions. The proper test for the va-
lidity of the rule then, as in Hanna, would have been the
application of the standards of the Enabling Act, which require
that the federal rule "not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right."'"
B. Applying the Hanna Analysis
By attributing no tolling function to rule 3, the Court
avoided a perhaps undesirable confrontation between federal
and state law, which would have necessitated the Court's making
a complex distinction between substantive and procedural is-
sues.6 5 Nevertheless, an analysis under Hanna would have better
protected federal interests without slighting substantive state in-
terests. It is possible that the Court would have determined that
application of rule 3 would modify substantive state interests
impermissibly under the Enabling Act. 6 Arguably, however, the
Court might have deemed the tolling effect of both rule 3 and
the state service provision to be purely procedural,67 and it then
could have applied rule 3 in this case.
The Court noted that the service requirement of the state
tolling provision does nothing to promote the general policy of
all statutes of limitations to keep stale claims out of court.6 8 It
omitted).
63. Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). See Ely, supra note 40, at 720 n.147.
65. See Ely, supra note 40, at 732 n.209. But see 100 S. Ct. at 1985 n.9. Ely states
that the Enabling Act makes important the distinction between substance and proce-
dure. Ely, supra note 40, at -723.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
67. See Gavit, States Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1949).
68. 100 S. Ct. at 1986 n.12.
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declared that, instead, the service requirement furthers a policy
of safeguarding each defendant's "right not to be surprised by
notice of a lawsuit after the period of liability has- run."' 9 Re-
quiring actual service helps to insure defendant's "peace of
mind" after an established deadline and to prevent his having
"to attempt to piece together his defense to an old claim. '70 On
this basis, the Court determined that the service requirement
was "integral" to the statute of limitations. 1
A distinction between the right to timely notice, in which
the state has a substantive interest, and the manner by which
timely notice is ensured, which is procedural, might have pro-
vided a basis for analysis of Walker under Hanna and the Ena-
bling Act. Under this analysis, the Court might have reached the
same result, with the conclusion that rule 3 did not displace the
state tolling rule. The service provision might have been deemed
substantive and, therefore, not subject to impairment by a fed-
eral rule because it prescribed the limit of the period after which
a potential defendant could expect not to be made party to a
suit unless he had had notice. In effect, the service provision
would ensure a right of repose for a potential defendant. 2
On the other hand, if the substantive state interest is timely
notice, the service requirement arguably might have been re-
garded as merely a procedural method by which to ensure that
the substantive interest is served. The state's substantive inter-
est, then, need not be impaired by a holding that rule 3 is con-
trolling. In Hanna itself, a service requirement was found to be
preempted by rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which was found to adequately ensure the state goal of effectua-
73tion of service. If the federal rules are, as it has been suggested
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1985. The Court's concern with these policies is proper in any analysis
relying on Erie and York. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), which is
fundamental to Erie and York, underlies cases in which application of state or federal
law is at issue and no federal rule of civil procedure is involved. One of the concerns of
the Rules of Decision Act is to avoid "subversion of state policies" that are substantive
rather than procedural. Ely, supra note 40, at 695, 708 & n.86, 714 & n.124, 716-n.126.
71. See 100 S. Ct. at 1985. "[T]he Oklahoma statute is a statement of substantive
decision that actual service. . . , and accordingly actual notice. . . .is an integral part
of the several policies served by the statute of limitations." Id.
72. See Ely, supra note 40, at 731.
73. 380 U.S. at 469 n.11. Rule 4(d)(1), at issue in Hanna, recognizes as alternate
methods both personal service and service at the abode of the person served. See FED. R.
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they should be, "viewed as an integrated whole and not as iso-
lated fragments, 7 4 the Court might have concluded that the ser-
vice requirements of rule 4 also would protect sufficiently the
state's substantive interest in timely notice, even if rule 3 were
to function as a tolling provision. Furthermore, although dismis-
sal under rule 4171 for failure to prosecute or to comply with any
of the rules has been termed "a drastic sanction. . . that should
be exercised only in extreme situations, 7 6 this protection of de-
fendant's right to timely notice by service of process is within
the power of the federal courts. Thus, the federal rules can safe-
guard a defendant from a plaintiff who seeks to gain an unfair
advantage in federal court by delay of service."
The state interest in timely notice furthered by the service
requirement, therefore, would not necessarily have been sacri-
ficed by a finding that compliance with rule 3 commences a fed-
eral diversity action for tolling purposes. Moreover, any state in-
terest in keeping stale claims out of court by means of an
established limitations period would not be diminished since the
Court stated that that interest was not furthered by the service
requirement.78 In this light, the court of appeals' observation
that the service requirement is "one of pure procedure"7 is sub-
stantiated and application of rule 3 would appear to be permissi-
ble under the Enabling Act. At least, an analysis under Hanna,
rather than under the holdings of Erie and York, might have
preserved better the federal interest in the integrity of the fed-
eral rules and uniformity of federal procedure.8 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The implication of the Supreme Court's decision in Walker
is that the federal interest in uniform federal procedure is less
Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
74. Carribean Constr. Corp. v. Kennedy Van Saun M. & E. Corp., 13 F.R.D. 124,
126-27 (1952).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
76. C. WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 435.
77. See id. at 264.
78. 100 S. Ct. at 1986 n.12. See text accompanying note 68 supra. See also Ely,
supra note 40, at 726. Ely suggests that the interest in keeping stale claims out of court
is procedural. Id.
79. 592 F.2d at 1135.
80. Cf Gavit, supra note 67, at 17. See also text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
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significant than the interest in uniform application of state law
in state and federal courts, at least in the statutes of limitations
area. The Court, in finding no "direct collision" between the
state and federal rules, avoided a confrontation between these
consequential interests, which bear upon all the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In so doing, although the Court made clear the
effect of rule 3 in diversity actions, it retreated from the policy
of Hanna-to promote a uniform system of procedure upon
which litigants in a federal action can rely.
Anne G. Rounds
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